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ABSTRACT 
 
In oil and gas industries, KPIs are normally required in order to evaluate the asset integrity 
performance. KPIs are selected from the most crucial performance indicators to the asset 
integrity. KPIs can also be used as a tool to manage risk from RBI analysis on Alvheim FPSO 
Topside. As part of corrosion management strategy, RBI analysis determines the risk level of 
each system by calculating the probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of failure (CoF) 
for particular systems. The risk levels depend on the actual process parameters on Alvheim 
FPSO Topside thus any change to the process parameters will of course affect the RBI 
analysis and Alvheim corrosion management system. All changes on the crucial process 
parameters are captured on the corrosion KPIs.       
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate and improve the corrosion and inspection 
management system at Alvheim FPSO Topside by developing the performance indicators of 
all plausible internal degradation mechanisms. The most crucial performance indicators are 
selected as KPIs. Each KPI has individual thresholds values that need to be compared to the 
measured data so the percentage of compliance can be determined.     
 
On Alvheim FPSO Topside, it has been noticed that the actual CO2 content in the 
hydrocarbon system is higher than the threshold KPI. The trend of average corrosion KPI 
compliance is stagnant due to zero compliance on the CO2 threshold content. Future 
corrective actions need to be agreed between the corrosion engineer, integrity engineer, 
process engineer, production engineer and chemical vendor. Further investigation on CO2 
corrosion is required; it might be the calculated corrosion rate is too conservative as there 
have been no findings so far from the last inspection campaign. The most suitable corrective 
action is to increase the threshold of CO2 content by altering the injecting rate of the corrosion 
inhibitors. These inhibitors reduce the CO2 corrosion rates thus the threshold of CO2 content 
can be increased. 
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NOTATION AND ABBREVIATION 
 
22Cr  Duplex Stainless Steel 
25Cr  Super Duplex Stainless Steel 
API  American Petroleum Institute 
ASM  ASM Materials-Formerly American Society for Metals 
CA  Corrosion Allowance 
CAPEX Capital Expenditures 
CIMS   Corrosion and Inspection Management System 
CoF  Consequence of Failure 
CR  Corrosion Rate 
CRA  Corrosion Resistant Alloys 
CS  Carbon Steel 
CuNi 90/10  Copper Nickel with approximately 90% of Cu and 10% Ni 
DNV  Det Norske Veritas 
FPSO  Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel 
JIP   Joint Industry Project 
KPI  Key Performance Indicator 
KRI  Key Result Indicator 
LTCS  Low Temperature Carbon Steel 
LTV  Life Time Value 
MIC  Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion 
MONAS Marathon Oil Norge AS 
NDT  Non Destructive Testing 
NPS   Nominal Pipe Size 
NORSOK Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon 
PFD  Process Flow Diagram 
PI  Performance Indicator 
P&ID   Piping and Instrumentation Diagram  
PM  Preventive Maintenance 
PoF  Probability of Failure 
PPB  Part per Billion 
PSV   Pressure Safety Valve 
RBI  Risk Based Inspection 
RP  Recommended Practice 
RuBI  FORCE’s software for carrying out a RBI analysis 
SCC  Stress Corrosion Cracking 
SMLS  Seamless 
SRB  Sulfate Reducing Bacteria 
SS  Stainless Steel 
SSC  Sulphide Stress Cracking 
UDC  Under Deposit Corrosion 
VUD  Vessel Upper Deck 
WT  Wall Thickness 
UT  Ultrasonic Testing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the background and the aim of this thesis. The 
contributions and limitations are also explained. 
 
1.1. Background 
 
A corrosion management system for Alvheim FPSO Topside is required in order to mitigate 
and control corrosion because corrosion is a primary threat to the asset integrity. Together 
with risk based inspections and a monitoring program; this corrosion management system will 
reduce and control the risk, ensuring asset integrity and reliability in a cost-effective manner. 
Corrosion risk assessment is the core element of a corrosion management system. Corrosion 
risk assessment is also known as RBI analysis and it defines the risk level of each system by 
calculating the probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of failure (CoF) for particular 
systems. These CoF and PoF levels depend on the actual process parameters on Alvheim 
FPSO Topside thus any change to the process parameter will of course affect the RBI analysis 
and Alvheim’s corrosion management system. Because of that, the most crucial process 
parameters need to be monitored by performance indicators in order to ensure the Alvheim 
RBI analysis or Alvheim corrosion management strategy are relevant and up to date.    
 
In oil and gas industries, KPIs are normally required in order to evaluate the asset integrity 
performance. KPIs are selected from the most crucial performance indicators to the asset 
integrity. KPIs can also be used as a tool to manage risk from RBI analysis on Alvheim FPSO 
Topside.      
 
1.2. Problem Description 
 
Some challenges occurred during establishing the corrosion KPIs for Alvheim FPSO Topside 
as follows: 
1. Selection of the most plausible internal corrosion threat of each system. 
2. Determine the threshold value of each performance indicator. It has been decided to 
follow the threshold value from the FORCE (2011) as it is more conservative than 
NORSOK M-001 (2004) and Stott (2003). These KPIs are live tools and if necessary 
need to be updated due to latest findings and experiments from third parties. 
Normally, the threshold values are taken from experiments or operator experience. 
3. Measurement locations for some performance indicators have to be decided later on 
due to time constraints.  
 
1.3. Aim of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate and improve the corrosion and inspection management 
system at Alvheim FPSO Topside by developing the performance indicators of all plausible 
internal degradation mechanisms. The most crucial performance indicators are selected as 
KPIs. Each KPI has individual threshold values that need to be compared to the measured 
data so the percentage of compliance can be determined.     
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1.4. Scope of Work 
 
In order to achieve the aim of the thesis, the project shall look into the following: 
1. Identify all plausible internal corrosion threats of each system on Alvheim FPSO Topside. 
2. Determine the highest risk level of each system from RuBI (FORCE’s software for 
carrying out a RBI analysis) 
3. Develop corrosion performance indicators of all plausible internal degradation 
mechanisms.  
4. Determine the threshold value of each performance indicator.  
5. Determine the KPIs from corrosion performance indicators. 
6. Collect all available data from Alvheim FPSO Topside and compare it with the threshold 
value. 
7. Generate the graphic of plotted average monthly KPI against the target level.  
8. Suggest risk mitigation or corrective action in order to increase the average KPI 
compliance. 
 
1.5. Limitation 
 
The limitations of this thesis are: 
1. Only Alvheim FPSO Topside pipework is considered in this thesis. All change in 
process parameters will also affect both pipework and static equipment but the static 
equipment is expected to be the least affected by process parameter change as it has a 
big volume and fluids are mixed inside. 
2. Only internal corrosion threats are considered in this thesis. 
3. Except for CO2 corrosion, the probabilities of failures are taken directly from FORCE 
(2011) without any further evaluation. 
4. A FORCE (2001) is used for RBI methodology. This procedure has the same main 
principles with DNV RP G101 (2009). 
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2. STUDY LITERATURE 
 
In order to select the correct corrosion key performance indicators at Alvheim FPSO Topside, 
a comprehensive understanding of RBI analysis or corrosion risk assessment, performance 
indicators and process parameters that affect internal corrosion of pipework are necessary. In 
this chapter, all necessary information will be explained based on literature studies and 
author’s knowledge and experience.   
 
2.1. RBI Analysis 
 
In tight operational budgets, correct design and selection of the piping system, pressure 
vessel, pressure safety valve or components that need to be inspected is vital. This selection 
shall consider the process conditions, component materials, geometry system, external factors 
and historical records. Figure 2.1 shows the effects of increasing expenditure on safety and 
inspection. Good business means users spend a reasonable amount of money to do limited 
inspection programs without increasing the asset risk. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  The effects of increasing expenditure on safety and inspection (Roberge, 2007)  
 
RBI is used in order to prioritize and manage the inspection programs of asset equipment.  It 
uses the risk analysis philosophy that risk is a multiplication of probability of failure and 
consequence of failure. Based on history as stated by Roberge (2007), RBI has been used 
since the late 1980s by several companies but its methodologies in the oil industry were 
developed in 1993 by a Joint Industry Project (JIP) and the American Petroleum Institute 
(API). Some key elements in RBI include knowing potential deterioration mechanisms that 
may lead to equipment failures, probability or likelihood of failures and the consequence of 
failures. The output of an RBI program can be used to demonstrate the value of proactive 
corrosion control and can be used as a communication tool to influence the decision makers 
and stakeholders in asset integrity and reliability. 
 
In an RBI program, equipment with high risk is inspected more frequently than other 
equipment. High risk equipment is defined as equipment that has a high probability of failure 
and severity consequence when it fails, refer to Figure 2.2. Probability of equipment failure is 
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determined based on knowledge of the corrosion process for calculating the corrosion rate, 
knowledge of normal and upset conditions and any inspection histories. This probability of 
failure may have to be updated due to ageing and major change in process conditions. 
Consequence of equipment failure is determined based on the fluid type and hazards that may 
be released, fluid volume and release rate. In API RP 580 (2009), there are three approaches 
for reducing the risk of operating equipment as follows: 
 
1. Optimizing inspection-monitoring. 
It is important that the existing inspection plan addresses all potential deterioration 
mechanisms and it is also beneficial to consider the inspection optimization in high risk and 
low risk systems. Changes should be made if the optimization will reduce the risk in the high 
risk system and changes should also be made if the optimization will reduce the inspection 
cost but not increase the risk in the low risk system.  
 
2. Material of construction changes. 
Any change in material selection will of course affect the probability of failure. High 
reliability material reduces the risk and the cost of inspection but increases the installation 
cost. For example, titanium or CuNi 90/10 material may be used for fire water piping systems 
due to their corrosion resistance in a seawater system but CuNi 90/10 material has lower 
reliability than titanium and therefore will incur higher maintenance costs. A life cycle cost 
analysis will help users during selection of the best material both in reliability and total cost.    
 
3. Key process parameters. 
The deterioration rate of equipment is influenced by process parameters such as fluid 
composition, temperature, pH, fluid velocity etc. These process parameters shall be monitored 
and maintained especially for the parameter that has greatest impact in the deterioration rate 
of equipment. Based on investigation experience, many failed equipment has been operating 
beyond one or more of the process parameter limits. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Typical risk matrix (Roberge, 2007)  
 
RBI is a technique for completing inspection plans based on risk and provides some benefits 
such as inspection optimization, monitoring recommendation and production system testing 
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plans. The benefits of an RBI application are shown in Figure 2.3. RBI delivers information 
such as a list of components to be inspected, inspection intervals, expected areas of 
components to be inspected, the inspection method and a findings report for continuous 
improvement. Generally, RBI is used for static equipment, e.g.: pipework, pressure vessels, 
tanks, heat exchangers etc. Failure risk of these components can be obtained by carrying out 
the RBI analysis where consequence failure and probability failure are treated separately.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. The benefits of an RBI Application (Morshed, 2009)  
 
 
2.2. Performance Indicators 
 
In the operation of an oil and gas asset, it is beneficial to know beforehand what parameters 
are affecting the operational performance and hence these parameters shall be controlled. 
These parameters are usually called performance indicators (PIs) and key performance 
indicators (KPIs). These can be used in order to optimize the need and sequence of inspection 
and other maintenance activities. The PIs and KPIs are ways to periodically assess the 
performance of a risk based inspection program. It is important to establish these PIs and 
KPIs in such a way so as to be understandable, meaningful and measurable. 
 
According to Parmenter (2007), there are three types of performance measures as follows: 
1. Key Result Indicators (KRIs).   
Typically these indicators are reviewed on a monthly basis which is a longer period of time 
than KPIs. In this thesis, KRIs and PIs are the same indicators. 
 
2. Performance Indicators (PIs).  
These indicators are lying in between KRIs and KPIs. The performance indicators which most 
affect the performance of operation will be selected as KPIs. 
 
3. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).  
Typically these indicators are reviewed on a daily basis and these indicators change the 
performance dramatically. 
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If we refer to Parmenter’s definition, the author observed that many performance measures 
are incorrectly termed KPIs. Many organizations have a lot of KPIs, some of which do not 
change the organization’s performance dramatically.     
The above performance measurements according to Parmenter can be illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4. Three types of performance measures (Parmenter, 2007) 
  
The performance indicators need to be established in the asset corrosion management 
strategy. These indicators will monitor the performance of the corrosion management strategy 
on a regular basis in order to ensure the strategy is always up to date and efficient. A 
corrosion management strategy can be defined as a strategy to maintain the asset integrity by 
mitigating the corrosion during operation of an oil and gas asset and managing all identified 
corrosion threats. The performance indicators are significantly maintaining and improving the 
pressure system integrity of an oil and gas asset.  The following are benefits of using 
performance indicators as part of corrosion management strategy as stated by Morshed 
(2008): 
1. Safety, Health and Environment is improved. 
2. Asset downtime is reduced. 
3. Maintenance costs for inspection campaigns and chemical treatment is reduced. 
 
 
2.3. Process Parameters 
 
As mentioned earlier, some process parameters will affect the deterioration rate of equipment. 
These parameters will be discussed as follows: 
 
 
1. Flow Effect 
 
The flow regime in a piping system can be laminar or turbulent flow. These two flow types 
can be defined by the Reynolds number which is dependent on flow velocity, pipe diameter, 
fluid viscosity and fluid density. A turbulent flow may increase the corrosion rate as the 
turbulent flow makes difficult for a corrosion inhibitor to cover all areas of a piping system 
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and also introduces cavitation and erosive conditions. The mechanical disturbance, e.g.: 
abrasion, impingement, turbulence and cavitation, may attack the protective film of metals 
and start the corrosion. Many erosion-corrosion happens where there are sudden changes in 
direction or flow such as pumps, valves, elbows, impellers etc. Flow regime affects the mass 
transfer to the metal surface and the shear stress on the metal surfaces thus influencing the 
corrosion rates on the metal surface.  
 
According to NACE (2007), flow assisted corrosion is defined as the combined action of 
corrosion and fluid flow and the type of flow assisted corrosion as follows: 
1. Erosion-corrosion. 
It occurs when the velocity of the fluid is sufficient to remove protective films from 
the metal surface. The flow is normally parallel to the material surface. 
2. Impingement 
It caused by turbulence or impinging flow where entrained air bubbles tend to 
accelerate the corrosion and this turbulence flow is directed roughly right angles to the 
material surface. 
3. Cavitation 
It is a mechanical damage process caused by collapsing bubbles in a flowing liquid. 
 
High flow rate or high flow velocity also cause higher corrosion rates by destructing the 
protective film on the metallic surface. Figure 2.5 shows a copper tube corroded due to a 
combination of localized high water velocity and cavitation. These localized high water 
velocity and cavitation occurred due to an interruption of smooth flow by the rough edge of 
the left elbow. Systems should be designed to limit fluid flow velocities to levels that can be 
tolerated by the materials. Generally, the fluid flow velocities are most commonly controlled 
by the proper selection of pipe sizes and the installation of instrument devices that are able to 
measure and control fluid flow so the maximum velocity is not exceeded. According to 
Copper (2012), the recommended maximum velocity for a cold water system in copper tubing 
is 2.5 m/s. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Corrosion on copper piping due to high water velocity and cavitation (Copper, 
2012) 
 
Flow
Collapsing bubbles 
Collapsing bubbles 
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2. Pressure 
 
Roberge (2007) states the presence of fluid phases in equipment may be affected by pressure 
thus these new phases produce different corrosive environments. For example, the amount of 
CO2 dissolved in water is affected by the CO2 partial pressure thus the fluid corrosivity will 
be changed. Sulfide stress corrosion cracking corrosion on some alloys are affected by H2S 
partial pressure. NORSOK M-506 (2005) also shows the corrosion rate of CO2 increases with 
increasing the pressure. 
    
3. Temperature 
 
The effect of temperature in corrosion rate is complex. In many cases, increasing temperature 
causes higher corrosion rates by increasing the chemical reaction rate or diffusion rates of 
ions to the surface films. In other cases, increasing the temperature can reduce corrosion rates 
at higher temperature by reducing the gas solubility. In a gas system, a dew point temperature 
plays an important part in the monitoring of corrosion rates. FORCE (2011) states a gas is 
called dry if the water dew point at the operational pressure is at least 10oC lower than the 
actual operating temperature thus no internal corrosion will be expected. 
 
 
4. Fouling 
 
Fouling is an accumulation of unwanted material of organic and inorganic substances from a 
fluid stream that may cause under deposit corrosion and pressure drop due to flow restriction. 
 
5. Microbes 
 
Microbes are present almost everywhere in soils, freshwater, seawater and air. The presence 
of a microorganism may cause Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC). 
Microorganisms refer to organisms that can’t be seen by the naked eye such as microalgae, 
bacteria and fungi. MIC cause a lot of problems in localized corrosion such as pitting, de-
alloying, enhanced erosion corrosion, enhanced galvanic corrosion, stress corrosion cracking 
and hydrogen embrittlement. MIC may occur at unpredicted locations with high corrosion 
rates. Except for titanium and high chromium-nickel alloys, all alloys have been affected by 
MIC. Systems affected by MIC are seawater, fresh water, hydrocarbon fuels, process 
chemicals, sewage etc. Stott (2003) states the most common bacteria causing MIC is Sulfate 
Reducing Bacteria (SRB) which is active only in anaerobic (oxygen free) environments. 
There are two types of SRB which are planktonic and sessile. Planktonic is floating or 
swimming in water meanwhile sessile is attached to the metal surface in biofilms. Most of the 
SRB and other bacteria present in water systems are sessile. SRB oxidizes sulfur compounds 
to sulfuric acid, as shown in Figure 2.6. Other acid-producing microorganisms including both 
bacteria and fungi may also cause MIC. 
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Figure 2.6. Association of anaerobic and aerobic bacteria (Sastri, 2007)  
 
  
The corrosion rate is increased when acidic products of bacterial action are trapped at the 
biofilm-metal interface. This biofilm is created when microbes adhere to metal surface. Revie 
(2008) stated that in the presence of hydrogen or organic matter, SRB easily reduce inorganic 
sulfates to sulfides and this reaction is helped by the presence of an iron surface as shown by 
the following possible reaction sequence: 
 
Anode    :  4Fe    →   4Fe2+  + 8e- 
Cathode :  8H2O  + 8e-   →   8Hads on Fe  + 8OH- 
 
                      bacteria  
    8Hads + Na2SO4                  4H2O + Na2S 
  Here the bacteria acts as depolarizers   
 
   Na2S  +  2H2CO3    →   2NaHCO3 + H2S 
    
Summary :     4Fe + 2H2O + Na2SO4 + 2H2CO3   →    3Fe(OH)2  +  FeS  +  2NaHCO3 
 
The corrosion products are ferrous hydroxide Fe(OH)2 and ferrous sulfide (FeS) with the ratio 
of 3:1 moles. Figure 2.7 shows the action of SRB in removing hydrogen from the steel surface 
to form FeS and H2S. The corrosion due to SRB can be confirmed qualitatively by adding a 
few drops of hydrochloric acid to the rust and smelling for hydrogen sulfide.   
 
Several approaches for controlling SRB stated by Review (2008), as follows: 
• Combination of low temperature and low humidity will reduce the presence of SRB 
       but fungi are still capable of growing in this condition so it is less effective. 
• Regular cleaning to prevent biofilm formation and subsequent corrosion. 
• Chlorination eliminates the bacteria but may not be good for the environment. 
• Aerated water reduces the MIC but creates another problem with dissolved oxygen 
corrosion. 
• Biocide can be beneficial but microorganism may become resistant after long term use so 
it is better to combine several chemicals or increase the dose of biocide. If the bacterial 
colonies have been established for an extended period the biocide treatment may have a 
limited effect without mechanical cleaning.  
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Figure 2.7. Steel corrosion in presence of Sulfate Reducing Bacteria (SRB) (Sastri, 2007)  
 
 
 
6. CO2 (Carbon Dioxide) 
 
As stated by Kermani (2003), CO2 corrosion failures have been reported to account for some 
25% of all safety incidents, 2.8% turnover, 2.2% tangible asset, 8.5% increase on CAPEX, 
5% of lost production and 11.5% increase to the lifting costs. This corrosion failure is 
common in carbon and low-alloy steel and usually classed as a sweet corrosion. In oil and gas 
production, dry CO2 gas is not corrosive but when dissolved in an aqueous phase, the CO2 
will promote an electrochemical reaction between steel and the contacting aqueous phase. The 
CO2 is soluble in water and brines (salt water). In water it will dissolve to give carbonic acid 
(H2CO3) as shown by the following possible reaction sequence as stated by George (2007): 
CO2 + H2O ↔ H2CO3 ↔ H+  + HCO3- 
HCO3- ↔ H+  + CO32- 
Direct reduction of H2CO3: 
 H2CO3 + e- → H  +  HCO3- 
Direct reduction of hydrogen ions: 
H+  +  e- →  H   
The solutions containing H2CO3 are more corrosive to mild steel than solutions of strong 
acids such as HCl (hydrochloric) and H2SO4 (sulfuric) at the same pH.  Kermani (2003) states 
the above reductions are still a topic of debate whether the H2CO3 is directly reduced on the 
metal surface or not, but it has been accepted that the H2CO3 is an additional source of 
hydrogen ions thus will lead to higher corrosion rates. It has been agreed between experts that 
the direct reduction of H2CO3 dominates at high partial pressures of CO2 and high pH 
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meanwhile the reduction of hydrogen ions dominates at low CO2 partial pressures and low 
pH. 
CO2 corrosion usually occurs in the general corrosion form and localized corrosion form. 
There are three variants of localized corrosion which are pitting corrosion, mesa attack 
corrosion and flow-induced localized corrosion. The rate of CO2 corrosion is affected by the 
following parameters according to Kermani (2003): 
• Temperature. 
• CO2 and H2S content. 
• Steel surface including the morphology of corrosion film, wax presence and ashphaltene. 
• Fluid dynamics. 
• Steel chemistry. 
• Water chemistry, pH, water wetting, hydrocarbon characteristic and phase ratios 
The above parameters that affect CO2 corrosion are shown in Figure 2.8; these parameters are 
interdependent and can interact in many ways to influence CO2 corrosion. It is noted that not 
all of these parameters are considered in the CO2 corrosion rate calculation model of 
NORSOK M-506 (2005). 
 
Figure 2.8. The influential parameter on CO2 corrosion (Kermani, 2003)  
 
In an oil and gas production asset, the following methods can be used to prevent CO2 
corrosion as stated by Kermani (2003): 
• Operational parameters to be modified by removing water content and control the flow 
and temperature at recommended range. 
• System design to be modified by removing the sharp bends, deadlegs and crevices. 
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• Chemistry of the environment to be modified by removing O2 in production flow, 
lowering CO2 partial pressure, removing H2S, adding corrosion inhibitor and increasing 
pH. 
• Interfacial condition of the metal to be modified by implementing cathodic protection or 
painting. 
• Using corrosion resistant alloys such as duplex stainless steel instead of carbon steel. 
• Using nonmetallic products such as GRP or GRE. 
 
7. H2S (Hydrogen Sulphide) 
 
In sour environments, the hydrogen sulfide promotes hydrogen absorbed into steel which will 
cause hydrogen embrittlement. Hydrogen embrittlement is the process of high-strength steel 
becoming brittle and fracturing following exposure to hydrogen, this type of failure is usually 
classed as sulphide stress cracking (SSC) as shown in Figure 2.9. This cracking phenomenon 
occurs when ordinary water is present in a sour system containing hydrogen sulfide gas, 
without water the SSC will not occur.    
 
According to Davis (2000), the following parameters affect the susceptibility to SSC: 
• The susceptibility to SSC increases with increasing hydrogen sulfide concentration. 
• The susceptibility to SSC increases with increasing H2S partial pressure. 
• The susceptibility to SSC decreases with increasing pH, when above pH 8 and below 101 
Pa (0.001 atm) partial pressure of H2S. 
• The susceptibility to SSC increases with increasing nickel content in steel. Steels 
containing more than 1% Ni are not recommended for service in sour environments. 
• The susceptibility to SSC increases with increasing strength of steels. 
 
Figure 2.9. Sulphide stress cracking on steel pipeline (Davis, 2000) 
The SSC failure can be prevented by following methods as stated by Davis (2000): 
• Using more resistant materials, such as lower-strength materials instead of higher-
strength materials. If lower-strength material can’t be used, the high-strength material 
needs to be tempered carefully for lowering the strength and improving the toughness.  
• Coating and lining to shield the material from sour environment. 
• Shot peening, grit blasting and face milling the steel surface to improve the resistance to 
SSC.  
• Using low-hydrogen welding rods during welding and carefully store the welding rod in a 
dry room. 
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8. Chloride  
 
Presence of chloride ions may have a major impact on corrosion behavior such as pitting 
corrosion as shown in Figure 2.10, crevice corrosion and chloride stress-corrosion cracking 
(SCC) as shown in Figure 2.11. Chloride is the most common agent for initiation of pitting as 
the passive film can break down locally and result in a pit forming. When a pit is formed, the 
local chemical environment is more aggressive than the bulk environment. Chloride SCC 
failure is common in 304 SS and 316 SS but not in high-nickel and high-molybdenum grades.  
These last two grades are resistant to SCC.  
 
According to Davis (2000), the following parameters affect the susceptibility to SCC: 
• The susceptibility to SCC increases with increasing chloride concentration. 
• The susceptibility to SSC increases with increasing intregranular precipitation which is a 
function of alloy composition, fabrication and heat treatment. 
The SCC failure can be prevented by following methods as stated by Davis (2000): 
• Apply barrier coating to stainless steel that prevents chloride contact with the stainless 
steel. 
• Change to SCC-resistant alloy such as high-nickel and high-molybdenum grades. 
• Shot peening to the steel surface improves the resistance to SCC.  
 
Figure 2.10. Pitting corrosion by an aerated sodium chloride (Davis, 2000) 
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Figure 2.11. Stress corrosion cracking on 316L stainless steel (Energy Institute, 2008) 
 
9. Effect of sand on erosion. 
 
Wall thinning on the pipe or vessel wall is often generated by sand erosion. This degradation 
typically occurs at an elbow and area close to the valve or restriction orifice. The erosion rate 
is increased with increasing the sand quantity and the fluid flow rate. Acoustic monitoring is 
one of the methods to monitor the sand erosion rate. NDT, such as ultrasonic and radiographic 
examination, can also be applied for checking the presence of sand erosion. 
 
10. O2 (Oxygen). 
 
In the aqueous corrosion situation, the dissolved oxygen quantity is playing an important role 
in the corrosion rate. As a cathodic depolarizer, oxygen reacts with hydrogen atoms thus 
allowing corrosion attack to continue and grow at an accelerated rate. The corrosion form is a 
localized corrosion such as pitting; the corrosion mechanism is shown in Figure 2.12 and the 
following possible reaction sequence as stated by Nalco (2000). 
 
Anode  : Fe0 →  Fe+2  + 2e- 
Cathode : 2e- + H2O + 1/2O2 → 2OH- 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Oxygen corrosion mechanism on steel (Nalco, 2000) 
 
Figure 2.13 shows the effect of oxygen concentration on the corrosion rate of low carbon steel 
in tap water at different temperatures, the corrosion rate increases with increasing 
temperatures. Oxygen corrosion can be minimized by both mechanical and chemical process. 
Mechanical process means mechanical deaeration such as heating the water in a boiler to 
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reduce its solubility and releasing it out of the system via venting, this process may reduce the 
oxygen content to less than 20 ppb. Roberge (2007) stated that reducing oxygen levels to 
below 20 ppb has a significant effect on the corrosion of carbon steel boilers but according to 
Nalco (2000), even with less than 20 ppb oxygen, the oxygen corrosion may still occurs thus a 
chemical scavenger is used as a supplement to mechanical deaeration to reduce the oxygen 
level to zero. One example of chemical scavenger is Nalco chemical which is sodium sulfite 
based. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Effect of oxygen concentration on the corrosion of low carbon steel in tap water 
at different temperatures (Roberge, 2007) 
 
11. Corrosion inhibitor effect on corrosion. 
 
Corrosion inhibitor prevents or reduces corrosion without significant impact to the 
components and is mainly used in closed systems that have good circulation so the inhibitor 
concentration can be controlled. Due to the potential variety of metals in a closed system, the 
inhibitor shall be selected with caution as inhibitors can provide good corrosion protection for 
one metal but may cause corrosion for other metals in the same system. Generally, corrosion 
inhibitors control corrosion by forming thin films that modify the environment at the metal 
surface. 
 
Davis (2000) states the corrosion inhibitors can be grouped based on its function, as follows: 
 
1. Anodic inhibitors. 
These inhibitors will selectively cover the anodic sites on the metal surface thus the corrosion 
rate will be decreased. It is critical to maintain the concentration of anodic inhibitors 
otherwise insufficient concentrations will accelerate the localized attack at the unprotected 
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layer. Chromates, nitrites, nitrates, phosphates, tungstates and molybdates are examples of 
these inhibitors. 
 
2. Cathodic inhibitors. 
These inhibitors reduce corrosion rates by blocking the cathodic sites by precipitation so the 
reduction reaction rate of the electrochemical corrosion cell is reduced. NACE (2007) stated 
that arsenic, bismuth and antimony compounds are examples of cathodic inhibitors.  
 
 
 
3. Ohmic inhibitors 
These inhibitors have strong adsorption to the metal surface and reduce the corrosion rate by 
decreasing the mobility of ionic species between anodes and cathodes on the corroding metal 
surfaces. Amines are examples of these inhibitors. 
 
4. Precipitation inhibitors. 
These inhibitors reduce the corrosion rates by promoting the formation of a bulky 
precipitation film over the entire surface. These inhibitors include silicates and phosphates.  
 
5. Vapor-phase inhibitors. 
These inhibitors neutralize moisture and promote the passive films formation when adsorbed 
on metal surfaces. The passive films will protect the metal surface from corrosion.  
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3. ALVHEIM FPSO TOPSIDE CORROSION MANAGEMENT 
 
In order to ensure the Alvheim corrosion management is relevant and up to date, the 
following bullet actions need to be made:    
• Identify all plausible internal corrosion threats of each system on Alvheim FPSO Topside. 
• Determine the highest risk level of each system from RuBI (FORCE’s software for 
carrying out a RBI analysis) 
• Develop corrosion performance indicators of all plausible internal degradation 
mechanisms.  
• Determine the threshold value of each performance indicator.  
• Determine the KPIs from corrosion performance indicators. 
• Collect all available data from Alvheim FPSO Topside and compare it with the threshold 
value. 
• Generate the graphic of plotted average monthly KPI against the target level.  
• Suggest risk mitigation or corrective action in order to increase the average KPI 
compliance. 
 
3.1. Introduction to Alvheim FPSO 
 
The Alvheim FPSO was converted from a multipurpose shuttle tanker. It has an overall length 
of 252 m, a 42 m breadth and 23 m depth with deadweight of 92000 tons. The Alvheim FPSO 
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. As of 2012, the daily oil production is approximately 142,000 
bopd (barrels oil per day) from six oil production lines which are East Kameleon, Boa, Kneler 
A, Kneler B, Vilje and Volund. These production lines are routed from the wells via risers to 
the topside process separation. Any water and gas will be separated from crude oil in the 
separators and the finest crude oil will be stored in cargo tanks and transferred by offloading 
to shuttle tankers. Gas from the separators will be treated and exported via the SAGE pipeline 
and some will be routed to the wells as gas lift. Water from the separators will be treated and 
disposed to overboard and disposal wells near the East Kameleon field. The topside facility 
design life is 20 years and it has at least 22 systems including process and utility systems 
which are described in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3.1. The Alvheim FPSO 
3.2. Corrosion and Inspection Management System (CIMS) 
 
A Corrosion and Inspection Management System (CIMS) is essential to be applied at 
Alvheim FPSO as corrosion is a major factor for risk contribution to the process facility 
integrity. The process facility includes piping systems, pressure vessels and other related 
equipment but not the PSVs and rotating equipment such as pumps and compressors. The 
main objective of a CIMS is to reduce the total cost of controlling corrosion by selecting 
correct materials, chemical and surface treatment and also by creating a risk based inspection 
and monitoring program for controlling or reducing the risk thus ensuring the asset integrity.  
A summary of Alvheim FPSO CIMS is illustrated in Figure 3.2. An inspection program is 
created following the corrosion management strategy and risk assessment, the inspection 
program includes visual inspection and Non Destructive Testing (NDT). The interval of the 
inspection program is calculated based on the RBI result. On Alvheim, corrosion monitoring 
is performed continuously using corrosion coupons. These coupons installed inside pipework 
and are replaced frequently. The replaced coupon will be analyzed in order to check the 
weight loss and the type of corrosion. The weight loss of a coupon is used to calculate the 
actual corrosion rate and compare it with the calculated corrosion rate in the corrosion 
management strategy. Process monitoring during operation is also part of monitoring as 
described in chapter 2, some process parameters may dramatically increase the actual 
corrosion rate. These process parameters will be monitored after performance indicators have 
been established and agreed.  
 
LQ Process
Offloading Hose 
Utility
Riser 
12 Mooring Lines 
STP
Topside 
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Some benefits of regularly monitoring after Alvheim CIMS implementation as follows: 
1. The performance and efficiency of Alvheim CIMS can be measured and evaluated. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, good business means users spend a reasonable amount of money 
to do limited inspection programs without increasing the asset risk. 
2. To ensure the Alvheim CIMS is up to date. 
3. The performance of Alvheim CIMS can be improved by improving the average KPI 
compliances.  
Some corrosion mitigations are taken during operation such as chemical treatment, surface 
protection and selecting reliable material during modification works. On Alvheim, chemicals 
such as corrosion inhibitor, wax inhibitor and scale inhibitor are injected frequently. Surface 
protection such as coating and insulation of pipework or equipment has to be properly 
maintained in order to reduce the probability of failure from an external degradation 
mechanism.      
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Alvheim FPSO CIMS (MONAS, 2008) 
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The objectives of the Alvheim FPSO Topside Corrosion Management Strategy as stated in 
MONAS (2008) are as follows: 
 
1. To provide a management directive with the purpose of controlling and minimizing 
the corrosion risk and cost over the lifetime of the field.  
2. To ensure that all relevant regulatory requirements are followed  
3. To keep high focus and minimize corrosion problems in high risk areas where loss of 
integrity will have impact on personnel safety, environment and economy/oil 
production.  
4. To minimize leaks caused by corrosion or erosion in high risk areas.  
5. To ensure that corrosion risk assessment reviews or updates are performed regularly to 
determine the need for inspection, corrosion and process monitoring, or enhancement 
of the corrosion mitigation by chemical treatment, surface protection or corrosion 
resistant materials.  
6. To ensure that all relevant corrosion performance data is available in an easily 
accessible management system.  
7. To define clear responsibility, accountability, and ownership of corrosion management 
throughout the Alvheim organization.  
8. To ensure that corrosion management is considered in the design stages of any 
modification project.  
 
3.3. RBI Analysis for Alvheim FPSO Topside 
 
A corrosion risk assessment is also known as a RBI analysis and the following information 
from Alvheim FPSO-Topside is needed during RBI analysis: 
- Process Line List which shows process parameters of line numbers such as pressure, 
temperature, flow, density, type of fluid etc. 
- Process Flow Diagram (PFD) which shows the mass balance or mole fractions of fluid 
flowing in the pipework. 
- P&ID (Piping and Instrumentation Diagram) which shows the piping of the process flow 
together with the installed equipment and instrumentation. 
- Piping material specification which shows the material of pipework including the 
thickness of the pipes. 
- Design life time is also required for RBI Analysis.  Alvheim FPSO-Topside is designed 
for 20 years life time. 
- Specification of coating and insulation for pipework and pressure vessel. 
- Historical data from inspection and monitoring, if available. 
As the line list contains more than 2800 line tags, the corrosion groups are needed for 
grouping these line tags which have similar parameter boundaries thus the possible 
degradation mechanisms of these tags in one corrosion group is the same.  In general, there 
are two degradation mechanisms of corrosion which are internal degradation mechanism and 
external degradation mechanism. The external degradation mechanism will not be discussed 
in this thesis. The steps of RBI analysis are illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3.  The steps of RBI process 
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A screening assessment has to be done before a detailed RBI analysis which allows user to 
define systems or subsystems that will not be included in a detailed RBI analysis. In this 
thesis, RBI is only applied to the static equipment on Alvheim FPSO-Topside such as 
pipework, pressure vessels, heat exchangers and other static equipment. The risk matrix 2 x 2 
as shown in Table 3.1 is used during the screening stage. This screening assessment complies 
with the generic RBI process stated in DNV RP-G101 (2009).  
The formula for calculating risk is defined as follows: 
Risk = Probability of Failure (PoF) x Consequence of Failure (CoF)           (Eq. 3.1) 
Table 3.1. Risk matrix during screening stage (FORCE, 2011) 
P 
A leak can occur     
(Significant) 
Inspection or mitigation 
can be used but is 
normally not cost 
effective.                           
Normally not included 
in detailed RBI 
Detailed RBI to be 
performed R 
O 
B 
A 
B 
Negligible 
Probability of a leak 
(Negligible) 
Inspection or mitigation 
normally not performed 
due to very low PoF and 
CoF.                                   
Not included in detailed 
RBI 
Detailed RBI normally 
done due to high CoF. I 
L 
I 
T 
Y 
ACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE 
CONSEQUENCE 
 
Probability of Failure (PoF) during screening stage can be defined in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Probability of Failure (PoF) during screening stage (FORCE, 2011) 
PoF Description       
Significant A leak can occur 
Negligible Negligible possibility of a leak 
A leak is not assumed under normal operation 
 
Meanwhile, the Consequence of Failure (CoF) during screening stage can be defined in Table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.3. Consequence of Failure (CoF) during screening stage (FORCE, 2011) 
CoF Description       
Consequence 
Categories 
Significant 
A leak can occur which is flammable, high-pressure 
or toxic Safety/Personnel 
A leak will only result in toxic pollution Environment 
A leak will result in downtime and loss of production Economy 
Negligible 
A leak is not flammable, low-pressure or non-toxic Safety/Personnel 
A leak will only result in small non-toxic pollution Environment 
A leak will not result in downtime and loss of 
production Economy 
 
The systems or subsystems which are not included in detailed RBI will be subject to a 
corrective or reactive management strategy.  
The risk matrix during detailed RBI is wider than the risk matrix during screening stage; refer 
to Table 3.4 for risk matrix 5x5.  
Table 3.4. The risk matrix during detailed RBI (FORCE, 2011) 
RISK CoF 
N L M H VH 
PoF 
VH N M H VH VH 
H N M H H VH 
M N L M H H 
L N L M M H 
N N L L M M 
 
Where: 
Risk : PoF x CoF 
PoF : Probability of Failure 
CoF : Consequence of Failure 
VH : Vey High Risk 
H : High Risk 
M : Medium Risk 
L : Low Risk 
N : Negligible Risk 
 
The above risk levels are evaluated based on its consequence to personnel, environment and 
economy and its probability of failure. The highest consequence from these three 
consequences will be chosen during a detailed RBI. 
 
The decisions trees as shown in Figure 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 are used to determine the consequence 
of failure. These trees were taken from FORCE (2011) and modified to fit with the system 
numbers on Alvheim FPSO Topside.  From these trees, it is noted that the multiplication 
factor increases with increasing temperature, volume and pressure. It also noted that the 
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multiplication factor for hydrocarbon system (system no.16, 20, 21, 23, 24 &27) is higher 
than others.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Consequence of failure to personnel safety (Modified from FORCE (2011)) 
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Figure 3.5. Consequence of failure to economy (Modified from FORCE (2011)) 
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Figure 3.6. Consequence of failure to environment (Modified from FORCE (2011)) 
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An example of calculating CoF: 
System Number  = System 21 
Pipe Material   = 6” NPS Schedule 40 A3336 6 SMLS (LTCS)   
Operating Temperature = 85oC 
Operating Pressure  = 14 bar 
The CoF to personnel safety = Very High, as F = 1 x 1.2 x 1.2 x 1.5 x 2.1 = 4.536 > 3.5 
The CoF to economy  = Medium, as F = 1 x 1.5 x 4 = 6 > 5 and 6 < 10 
The CoF to environment = High, as F = 1 x 1.5 x 2.3 = 3.45 > 2.7 and 3.45 < 3.5 
The highest CoF will be used during detailed RBI so CoF above pipework = Very High. 
 
According to FORCE (2011), the probability of failure in a detailed RBI can be defined as a 
function of Lifetime Values (LTV) shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. PoF is defined as a function of LTV (FORCE, 2011) 
 
LTV Probability of Failure 
>4 5 Very High 
1-4 4 High 
0.5-1 3 Medium 
0.2-0.5 2 Low 
<0.2 1 Negligible 
 
 
LTV can be calculated as follows: 
LTVൌ CRtCRcritical 
                                                 (Eq. 3.2) 
Where: 
CRt is the wall thinning rate due to corrosion or erosion at time t which is given below: 
CRt = a*CRinsp  +  b*CRmon  +  c*CRcalc    (Eq. 3.3) 
Where: 
a, b and c are weight factors and sum of a, b and c are equal to 1. 
CRinsp = Wall thinning rate due to corrosion or erosion based on inspection data such as UT 
etc. 
CRmon = Wall thinning rate due to corrosion or erosion based on monitoring data such as 
metallic corrosion coupons etc. 
CRcalc = Wall thinning rate due to corrosion or erosion based on calculated data such as CO2 
corrosion rates in NORSOK M-506 etc. NORSOK M-506 (2005) uses an empirical corrosion 
rate model for carbon steel in water containing CO2 at different temperatures, pH’s, CO2 
fugacities and wall shear stresses.  
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Only CRcalc will be used for calculating LTV value as the value of CRinsp and CRmon are not 
always available in every system thus the value a and b are set to zero. 
Depending on the specific material and environment, the corrosion rate of uniform 
degradation can be linear, decreasing with time or increasing with time. Long term projection 
of corrosion damage is possible when the corrosion rate is linear or decreases with time. It is 
more difficult to predict long-term corrosion damage if the corrosion rates increase with time.  
CRcritical is the critical wall thinning rate for complete utilization of the wall thickness without 
loss of piping integrity which is defined in Eq. 3.4. 
 
CRcriticalൌ 
WTn‐WTcritical
LTD  
                                                                                   (Eq. 3.4) 
 
Where: 
LTD  = Design life time (years). Alvheim FPSO Topside is designed for 20 years life 
time. 
WTn  = Nominal wall thickness (mm). This value is taken from piping material 
specification. 
WTcritical = Minimum required wall thickness (mm). This value does not include the 
allowances such as corrosion allowance and mill tolerance. It can be calculated from formula 
3a in ASME B31.3 (2010), as shown in Eq. 3.5. 
 
WTcriticalൌ
PD
2ሺSHE൅PYሻ 
                                                 (Eq. 3.5) 
 
Where: 
P = Internal design pressure (barg) 
D = Outside diameter of the pipe (mm) 
SH = Allowable stress of the pipe at design temperature (N/mm2) 
E = Basic quality factors for longitudinal weld joints in pipes, tubes and fitting. Usually 
the value is equal to 1 for seamless pipe. 
Y = Coefficient value and usually the value is equal to 0.4 for ductile metals. 
 
An example of calculating PoF: 
 
System   = 21 
Pipe Material   = 6” NPS Schedule 40 A333 Grade 6 SMLS (LTCS)   
Operating Temperature = 85oC 
Operating Pressure  = 14 bar 
Mol% CO2 in gas  = 0.7 mol% 
Shear Stress   = 10 Pa 
pH    = 6.5 
Glycol concentration  = 0% 
Inhibitor efficiency  = 0% 
CRcalc in accordance to NORSOK M-506 = 0.14 mm/year as shown in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7. CO2 corrosion rate (NORSOK M-506, 2005) 
 
 
The minimum required wall thickness of 6” LTCS (Low Temperature Carbon Steel) under 
internal pressure of 14 barg at 85oC using Eq. 3.5 as follows: 
  
WTcriticalൌ
14 barg*168.3 mm
2ሺ1379 barg*1൅14 barg*0.4ሻ ൌ0.851 mm 
 
 
The nominal thickness of 6” pipe schedule 40 is equal to 7.11 mm thus the CRcritical is 
calculated from Eq. 3.4 as follows: 
 
CRcriticalൌ 
WTn‐WTcritical
LTD ൌ
7.11 mm‐0.851 mm
20 year ൌ0.313
mm
year 
 
The LTV is calculated from Eq. 3.2 as follows: 
 
LTVൌ CRtCRcritical ൌ
CRcalculated
CRcritical ൌ
0.14 mm/year
0.313 mm/year ൌ0.45 
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According to the LTV as shown in Table 3.5, the probability of failure of 6” LTCS Pipe  due 
to internal degradation mechanism is Low (PoF = 2). 
The risk of 6” NPS Schedule 40 A333 Grade 6 SMLS LTCS in system 21 is high as it has low 
PoF and very high CoF, refer to Table 3.4. 
 
3.4. Material for Piping and Static Equipment on Alvheim FPSO Topside  
 
On Alvheim FPSO Topside, the materials of piping and static equipment were selected based 
on CO2 corrosion calculations of NORSOK M-506 and process simulations for the design 
case of 2018 as this case has the highest CO2 content. To a large extent, carbon steel material 
should be selected for pipework and equipment in order to reduce cost of CAPEX.  Alvheim 
piping specification has a maximum of 3 mm corrosion allowance for carbon steel thus the 
Corrosion Resistant Alloy (CRA) shall be selected if the CO2 calculated corrosion rate of 
carbon steel exceeds 0.15 mm/year due to the design life of 20 years. The service class 
summary of Alvheim FPSO Topside with its internal corrosion threats is shown in Table 3.6. 
This table also shows that Alvheim FPSO Topside has at least five different materials for 
pipework which are carbon steel, austenitic stainless steel (316 SS), duplex stainless steel 
(22Cr), super duplex stainless steel (25Cr) and titanium (Ti). Carbon steel has many internal 
corrosion threats compare to other materials. Titanium is the most reliable material but it is 
the most expensive material compared to others.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 3.6. Internal corrosion threat on Alvheim FPSO topside 
 
 
(table continued on next page) 
MATERIAL C.A SYSTEM 
NUMBER
SERVICE INTERNAL CORROSION THREATS
20 Crude Oil Stabilization and 
Separation
CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion- 
Corrosion, Corrosion Fatigue
21 Crude Oil metering CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion- 
Corrosion, Corrosion Fatigue
23 Re-Compression CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion- 
Corrosion, Corrosion Fatigue
24 Gas Dehydration CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion- 
Corrosion, Corrosion Fatigue
27 Gas Export CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion- 
Corrosion, Corrosion Fatigue
41 Heating Medium O2 Corrosion, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion and Erosion-
Corrosion
43 Flare, Vent, VOC Recovery 
and Blanket Gas 
CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion-
Corrosion & Corrosion Fatigue
45 Fuel Gas CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion-
Corrosion & Corrosion Fatigue
46 Methanol None
57 Closed Drain CO2 Corrosion, SSC, MIC, UDC, Galvanic Corrosion, Erosion-
Corrosion & Corrosion Fatigue
63 Compressed Air None
64 Inert Gas None
16 Topside flowlines and 
manifold
SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
20 Crude Oil Stabilisation and 
Separation
SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
27 Gas Export SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
29 Water Injection SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
44 Produced Water SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
53 High Pressure Fresh Water None
56 Open Drain O2 Corrosion
57 Closed Drain SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
CS 3 mm
22Cr 
Duplex 0 mm
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More than 2800 line tags including equipments are analyzed in detailed RBI. FORCE has 
developed software for handling and organization of all data considered necessary for 
carrying out a detailed RBI analysis and this software is called RuBI. A result from RuBI has 
been used to generate Table 3.7 that shows the highest risk due to internal degradation 
mechanism of each system. 
 
 
 
 
MATERIAL C.A SYSTEM 
NUMBER
SERVICE INTERNAL CORROSION THREATS
50 Sea Water O2 Corrosion and Erosion-Corrosion
56 Open Drain O2 Corrosion
16 Process Blow Down SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
20 Crude Oil Stabilisation and 
Separation
SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
23 Re-Compression SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
24 Gas Dehydration SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
27 Gas Export SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
42 Chemical Injection None
43 Flare SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
46 Methanol None
53 Fresh Water None
57 Closed Drain SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
62 Diesel Oil SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
63 Compressed Air None
64 Inert Gas None
65 Hydraulic Oil SSC and Erosion-Corrosion
47 Electro Chlorination Immune if the operating temperature below 85oC
50 Sea Water Immune if the operating temperature below 85oC
71 Fire Water Immune if the operating temperature below 85oC
316SS
Titanium
25Cr 
Duplex 0 mm
0 mm
0 mm
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Table 3.7. Risk of internal corrosion for each system on Alvheim FPSO Topside  
 
(table continued on next page) 
MATERIAL SYSTEM 
NUMBER
SERVICE CoF 
Personnel
CoF 
Environment
CoF 
Economy
PoF 
Risk of 
Internal 
Corrosion
20 Crude Oil Stabilization and 
Separation Very High High High High Very High
21 Crude Oil metering Very High High High Very High Very High
23 Re-Compression Very High Medium High Very High Very High
24 Gas Dehydration Very High Medium Medium High Very High
27 Gas Export Very High Medium High Very High Very High
41 Heating Medium Low Medium Low Negligible Low
43 Flare, Vent, VOC Recovery 
and Blanket Gas Medium Low Medium High High
45 Fuel Gas High Medium Medium Negligible Medium
46 Methanol Low Low Low Low Low
57 Closed Drain Very High High High High Very High
63 Compressed Air Low Low Low Low Low
64 Inert Gas Low Low Low Low Low
16 Topside flowlines and 
manifold Very High High High Low High
20 Crude Oil Stabilisation and 
Separation Very High High High Medium High
27 Gas Export Very High High High Negligible Medium
29 Water Injection Low Medium Medium Negligible Low
44 Produced Water Medium Medium Medium Negligible Low
53 High Pressure Fresh Water Low Low Low Low Low
56 Open Drain Negligible Negligible Low Negligible Low
57 Closed Drain High Low Medium Negligible Medium
CS
22Cr 
Duplex
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3.5. Internal Degradation Mechanisms on Alvheim FPSO Topside 
 
In order to determine the corrosion performance indicators, the following plausible internal 
corrosion threats on Alvheim FPSO Topside need to be discussed together with the method 
for finding its threshold: 
• CO2 corrosion 
• O2 corrosion 
• Sulphide Stress Cracking (SCC) 
MATERIAL SYSTEM 
NUMBER
SERVICE CoF 
Personnel
CoF 
Environment
CoF 
Economy
PoF 
Risk of 
Internal 
Corrosion
50 Sea Water Negligible Negligible Negligible Very High Medium
56 Open Drain Negligible Negligible Low Negligible Low
16 Process Blow Down High Medium Medium Negligible Medium
20 Crude Oil Stabilisation and 
Separation Very High Medium High Negligible Medium
23 Re-Compression High Medium Medium Negligible Medium
24 Gas Dehydration Very High High High Negligible Medium
27 Gas Export High Medium Medium Negligible Medium
42 Chemical Injection Negligible Low Low Negligible Low
43 Flare High Medium Medium Negligible Medium
46 Methanol Low Low Low Low Low
53 Fresh Water Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
57 Closed Drain High Low Medium Negligible Medium
62 Diesel Oil Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
63 Compressed Air Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
64 Inert Gas Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
65 Hydraulic Oil Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
47 Electro Chlorination Low Low Low Low Low
50 Sea Water Low Low Low Low Low
71 Fire Water Low Low Low Low Low
316SS
Titanium
25Cr 
Duplex
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• Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) 
• Under Deposit Corrosion (UDC) 
• Galvanic Corrosion 
• Erosion Corrosion 
• Corrosion Fatigue 
We will focus deeply on CO2 corrosion as it is the most relevant threat to Alvheim FPSO 
Topside integrity.  
3.5.1. CO2 Corrosion 
Generally, only carbon steel is susceptible to this internal degradation mechanism. Several 
factors affecting the corrosion rate of CO2 were discussed in Chapter 2. FORCE has 
developed software for CO2 corrosion rate calculation based on NORSOK M-506. In this 
software, author noticed that an interpolation has been made for the condition when CO2 
fugacity is outside the range limit of NORSOK M-506. The range limit of CO2 fugacity as 
stated in NORSOK M-506 is 0.1 to 10 bara thus the calculation made by FORCE software for 
the CO2 fugacity lower than 0.1 bara or above 10 bara is uncertain. This uncertainty will not 
be discussed in this thesis due to time constraint, but all calculation related to CO2 corrosion 
are using FORCE software except for Figure 3.7.   
 
By using FORCE software, the prediction of CO2 corrosion rate is changed due the following 
effects: 
 
1. Effect of temperature. 
 
The effect of temperature to predict the corrosion rate may vary. From Figure 3.8, we know 
that the predicted corrosion rate increases with increasing the temperature from 0o C to 40o C 
then reducing afterwards.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Effect of temperature on CO2 corrosion rate (FORCE, 2011) 
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2. Effect of pressure. 
 
The predicted corrosion rate increases with increasing internal operating pressures of the 
system. The correlation between pressure and corrosion rate is a linear correlation as shown in 
Figure 3.9. According to NORSOK M-506 (2005), the predicted corrosion rate can be 
calculated by using the following formulas: 
 
For temperature 20oC, 40oC, 60oC, 80oC, 90oC, 120oC and 150oC:  
CR
t 
= K
t 
x f
CO2 
0,62 
x (S/19)
0,146 + 0,0324 log (fCO2) 
x f(pH)
t (mm/year)             (Eq. 3.6) 
 
For temperature 15oC:  
CR
t 
= K
t 
x f
CO2 
0,36 
x (S/19)
0,146 + 0,0324 log (fCO2) 
x f(pH)
t 
(mm/year)             (Eq. 3.7) 
 
For temperature 5oC:  
CR
t 
= K
t 
x f
CO2 
0,36 
x f(pH)
t  (mm/year)                                        (Eq. 3.8) 
 
Where: 
CRt  : Corrosion Rate at temperature t in mm/year. 
Kt  : The constant value for the temperature t used in the corrosion rate calculations. 
S  : The wall shear stress in Pa. We use 10 Pa for all calculation in this report. 
f(pH)
t : The pH factor at temperature t. 
T  : The operating temperature of the system given in Kelvin. 
P  : The operating pressure of the system given in bara. 
fCO2  : The fugacity of CO2 in bar. It is a function of internal pressure of the system, 
temperature and CO2 concentration. 
fCO2  : 10 
P x (0,0031 - 1,4/T)  x  (mole% CO2 in the gas phase/100%) x P, for P ≤ 250 bara 
 
Example 1: 
pH   = 6.5 
Shear stress = 10 Pa 
Mole% CO2 = 0.3 
Pressure = 20 bara, 30 bara, 40 bara and 50 bara. (varies)   
Temperature = 60oC, 80oC and 90oC (varies)   
In this example, we would like to see the effect of pressure to CO2 corrosion rate with varying 
the temperature. Figure 3.9 shows the CO2 corrosion rate increases linearly with increasing 
operating pressure. It also noted that the corrosion rate is slightly increased when we increase 
the operating temperature to 80oC but the corrosion rate is suddenly dropped when we 
increase the operating temperature to 90oC.  
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Figure 3.9. Effect of pressure on CO2 corrosion rate 
 
 
 
3. Effect of CO2 content. 
 
The predicted corrosion rate increases with increasing the CO2 concentration of the system. 
The correlation between CO2 concentration and corrosion rate is a linear correlation as shown 
in Figure 3.10. 
 
Example 2: 
pH   = 6.5 
Shear stress = 10 Pa 
Temperature = 60o C 
Pressure = 20 bara, 30 bara and 40 bara. (varies)   
Mole% CO2 = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 (varies)   
 
In this example, we would like to see the effect of CO2 content to CO2 corrosion rate with 
varying the pressure. Figure 3.10 shows the CO2 corrosion rate increases linearly with 
increasing CO2 content and pressure.  
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Figure 3.10. Effect of mole% CO2 on CO2 corrosion rate 
 
 
4. Effect of pH.  
 
Usually reported pH in water analysis is measured after depressurization and the sample is 
exposed to the atmosphere thus this data gives no information about in-situ pH which is 
mandatory for corrosion rate calculation. NORSOK M-506 (2005) helps us to calculate the in-
situ pH by giving three options in water chemistry of fluid. The three options are condensed 
water with no Fe2+ saturation, condensed water with Fe2+ saturation and formation water. 
Usually, the formation water will give a higher pH thus the predicted CO2 corrosion rate will 
be reduced.  Figure 3.11 shows the predicted corrosion rate increases with increasing acidity 
of the system (lower pH). 
 
Example 3: 
Shear stress = 10 Pa 
Temperature = 60o C 
Mole% CO2 = 0.3 
Pressure = 20 bara, 30 bara and 40 bara. (varies)   
Calculated pH = 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6.0 and 6.5 (varies)   
 
In this example, we would like to see the effect of calculated pH to CO2 corrosion rate with 
varying the pressure. Figure 3.11 shows the CO2 corrosion rate reduces dramatically with 
increasing calculated pH.   
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Figure 3.11. Effect of pH on CO2 corrosion rate 
 
5. Effect of glycol and corrosion inhibitors.  
 
NORSOK M-506 (2005) states the effects of glycol and corrosion inhibitor on the corrosion 
rate are used as a reduction factor and the effect giving the highest reduction factor will be 
used on the corrosion rate calculation. This effect will not be evaluated in this thesis as none 
of them are used during the CO2 corrosion rate calculation. 
 
 
More than 2800 line tags including equipment are analyzed in a detailed RBI. As mentioned 
in Table 3.6, CO2 corrosion only occurs in carbon steel material but when carbon steel 
material is exposed to dry gas, no internal corrosion occurs. All tags that affected by CO2 in 
RuBI (FORCE’s software for carrying out a RBI analysis) have been filtered and sorted out to 
get 46 corrosion groups as shown in Table 3.8. These groups represent all topside carbon steel 
pipework and equipment thus any change in process parameters will affect the actual 
corrosion rate and life time of all topside carbon steel pipework and equipment. Operating 
temperature and pressure are taken from Alvheim line lists, CO2 concentration is taken from 
process simulation or PFD in year 2018. The pH value and CO2 corrosion rate are calculated 
by using FORCE software based on NORSOM M-506. Corrosion rate critical (CR critical) 
and Life Time Value (LTV) are calculated from Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.2 respectively. PoF is 
selected based on Table 3.5 and corrosion rate upper (CR upper) and corrosion rate lower (CR 
lower) are calculated based on PoF range in Table 3.5 and Eq. 3.2. For example as follows: 
 
1. Corrosion group 24-07 with tag 0002-PL-24L0020-AC11-00. 
  
Definition of tag 0002-PL-24L0020-AC11-00 based on Alvheim specification as 
follows: 
- 0002 means 2” NPS (Nominal Pipe Size) 
- PL means Process hydrocarbons liquid. 
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- 24L0020 means system no. 24 with line number L0020 
- AC11 means piping class AC11 as stated in NORSOK L-001 (1999) 
- Piping material description is A333 6 SMLS as stated in NORSOK L-001 
(1999) 
- Outside pipe diameter of 60.3 mm as stated in NORSOK L-001 (1999) 
- Piping allowable stress of 1379 barg is taken from ASME B31.3 (2010) 
 
Nominal wall thickness = 5.54 mm 
Operating temperature = 87oC 
Operating pressure  = 10 bara. 
Mol CO2%   = 0.3% 
Calculated pH   = 4.73 
CO2 corrosion rate  = 0.43 mm/year 
  WT critical can be calculated from Eq. 3.5 as follows:  
WTcriticalൌ
9 barg*60.3 mm
2ሺ1379 barg*1൅9 barg*0.4ሻ ൌ0.33 mm 
 
CRcritical is calculated from Eq. 3.4 as follows: 
 
CRcriticalൌ 
WTn‐WTcritical
LTD ൌ
5.54 mm‐0.33 mm
20 year ൌ0.26
mm
year 
 
The LTV is calculated from Eq. 3.2 as follows: 
 
LTVൌ CRtCRcritical ൌ
CRcalculated
CRcritical ൌ
0.43 mm/year
0.26 mm/year ൌ1.65 
  
CR upper is calculated based on the highest LTV value can be in a High PoF level and 
meanwhile CR lower is calculated based on the lowest LTV value can be in a High 
PoF level, refer to Table 3.5. 
 CR upper = Highest LTV x CRcritical = 4 x 0.26 = 1.04 mm/year  
 CR lower = Lowest LTV x CRcritical = 1 x 0.26 = 0.26 mm/year 
 
According to Table 3.8, only five corrosion groups meet our requirement criteria during 
material selection because these groups have calculated corrosion rate less than 0.15 mm/year. 
As mentioned earlier, the corrosion allowance of carbon steel in Alvheim piping specification 
is 3 mm and the topside design life time is 20 years thus the maximum corrosion rate of 
carbon steel is 3 mm/20 years or equal to 0.15 mm/year otherwise CRA has to be selected. 
These five corrosion groups are 20-08, 20-14, 20-17, 23-06A and 23-06B. The first two digits 
show the system number of the corrosion group so the five groups are located in system 20 
and system 23 respectively. The remaining 41 groups have higher calculated corrosion rate 
than 0.15 mm/year but 11 out of 41 groups have higher CR critical than CR CO2 meaning the 
calculated corrosion rates are still within allowable limits. We may say the CR critical is the 
allowable corrosion rate as mentioned in Eq. 3.4. These 11 groups are 20-9, 20-11, 20-12, 20-
13, 20-16, 23-01A, 23-01B, 23-02A, 23-02B, 23-03A and 23-03B. The PoF of these 11 
groups is medium and will not lose its integrity during 20 years in operation as long as there is 
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no increase in the operating pressure and temperature. The CR critical reduces when 
increasing the operating temperature and pressure thus the probability of failure is increased. 
 
The remaining 30 groups may have lost their integrity within 20 years operation as the PoF ≥ 
high and these groups need further investigation. An additional inspection program has to be 
performed such as radiography testing on dead leg pipework in order to confirm the 
corrosion. Dead leg location is chosen as it is the low point and water condensation may be 
trapped there and also debris may settle there.  
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 Table 3.8. CO2 calculated corrosion rate of carbon steel material on Alvheim FPSO Topside  
Tag number 
Nominal 
wall 
thickness 
(mm) 
Operating 
temperature 
(oC) 
Operating 
pressure 
(bara) 
Mol CO2 
from PFD 
2018 (%) 
pH 
Corrosion 
rate (CR) 
upper 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)  
lower 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)   
CO2 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)    
critical 
(mm/year) 
Current 
life time 
value  
PoF 
Corrosion 
group 
0002-PL-20L0083-AC11-04 5.54 75 2 0.3 6.50 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.15 Negligible 20-08 
0008-PV-20L0036-AC11-00 6.35 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.72 Medium 20-09 
0008-PB-20L0033-AC11-37 6.35 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.72 Medium 20-11 
0002-PV-20L0068-AC11-03 5.54 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.73 Medium 20-12 
0006-PL-20L0093-AC11-04 7.11 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.31 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.61 Medium 20-13 
0016-PL-20L0042-AC11-03 7.92 75 2 0.3 6.50 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.14 Negligible 20-14 
0006-PV-20L0095-AC11-04 7.11 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.31 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.61 Medium 20-16 
0010-PL-21L0003-AC11-37 6.35 75 2 0.3 6.50 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.16 Negligible 20-17 
0010-PL-21L0010-AC11-06 6.35 40 7.8 0.3 4.60 0.99 0.25 0.73 0.25 2.94 High 21-01 
0012-PV-23L1001-AC11-37 6.35 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.81 Medium 23-01A 
0012-PV-23L2001-AC11-37 6.35 75 2 0.3 5.03 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.81 Medium 23-01B 
0012-PT-23L1002-AC11-07 6.35 30 2 0.3 4.86 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.89 Medium 23-02A 
0012-PT-23L2002-AC11-07 6.35 30 2 0.3 4.86 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.89 Medium 23-02B 
0012-PV-23L1003-AC11-08 6.35 30 1.55 0.3 4.91 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.72 Medium 23-03A 
0012-PV-23L2003-AC11-08 6.35 30 1.55 0.3 4.91 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.72 Medium 23-03B 
0008-PT-23L1007-AC11-07 6.35 101 5.8 0.3 4.90 0.26 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.53 Medium 23-06A 
0008-PT-23L2007-AC11-07 6.35 101 5.8 0.3 4.90 0.26 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.53 Medium 23-06B 
0010-PV-23L1008-AC11-08 6.35 30 5.07 0.3 4.66 0.99 0.25 0.41 0.25 1.65 High 23-07A 
0010-PV-23L2008-AC11-08 6.35 30 5.07 0.3 4.66 0.99 0.25 0.41 0.25 1.65 High 23-07B 
0004-PB-23L1045-BC11-37 6.02 106 21 0.3 4.65 0.96 0.24 0.54 0.24 2.26 High 23-08A 
0004-PB-23L2045-BC11-37 6.02 106 21 0.3 4.65 0.96 0.24 0.54 0.24 2.26 High 23-08B 
0008-PV-23L1006-AC11-38 6.35 101 14 0.3 4.71 1.05 0.26 0.36 0.26 1.37 High 23-10A 
0008-PV-23L2006-AC11-38 6.35 75 14 0.3 4.61 1.05 0.26 1.04 0.26 3.97 High 23-10B 
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(table continued from previous page) 
Tag Number 
Nominal 
wall 
thickness 
(mm) 
Operating 
temperature 
(oC) 
Operating 
pressure 
(bara) 
Mol CO2 
from PFD 
2018 (%) 
pH 
Corrosion 
rate (CR) 
upper 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)  
lower 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)   
CO2 
(mm/year) 
Corrosion 
rate (CR)    
critical 
(mm/year) 
Current 
life time 
value  
PoF 
Corrosion 
group 
0003-PT-24L0010-DC11-00 7.62 30 61 0.3 4.15 0.99 0.99 2.06 0.25 8.33 Very High 24-02 
0003-PT-24L0012-DC11-00 7.62 30 80 0.3 4.11 0.99 0.99 2.37 0.25 9.58 Very High 24-06 
0002-PL-24L0020-AC11-00 5.54 87 10 0.3 4.73 1.04 0.26 0.43 0.26 1.65 High 24-07 
0002-PV-27L1022-BC11-07 5.54 106 21 0.3 4.65 0.93 0.23 0.54 0.23 2.33 High 27-01 
0002-PV-27L2022-BC11-07 5.54 110 21 0.3 4.66 0.93 0.23 0.50 0.23 2.16 High 27-02 
0003-PV-27L1020-BC11-00 5.49 30 18.3 0.3 4.39 0.83 0.83 1.03 0.21 4.96 Very High 27-05B 
0003-PV-27L2020-BC11-00 5.49 30 18.3 0.3 4.39 0.83 0.83 1.03 0.21 4.96 Very High 27-06B 
0006-PV-27L1012-DC11-37 10.97 95 57 0.3 4.40 1.12 1.12 1.74 0.28 6.23 Very High 27-07 
0006-PV-27L2012-DC11-37 10.97 95 57 0.3 4.40 1.12 1.12 1.74 0.28 6.23 Very High 27-08 
0003-PB-27L1030-DC11-37 7.62 125 62 0.3 4.49 0.99 0.99 1.17 0.25 4.73 Very High 27-11 
0003-PB-27L2030-DC11-37 7.62 125 62 0.3 4.49 0.99 0.99 1.17 0.25 4.73 Very High 27-12 
0010-PT-27L1007-DC11-07 15.06 22 57 0.3 4.14 1.27 1.27 1.50 0.32 4.74 Very High 27-13 
0002-PL-27L1009-DC11-00 8.71 22 57 0.3 4.14 1.36 1.36 1.50 0.34 4.42 Very High 27-15 
0002-PL-27L2034-DC11-04 8.71 22 57 0.3 4.14 1.36 1.36 1.50 0.34 4.42 Very High 27-16 
0004-PV-27L1035-DC11-00 8.56 22 57 0.3 4.14 0.98 0.98 1.50 0.25 6.12 Very High 27-17 
0004-PV-27L2035-DC11-00 8.56 22 57 0.3 4.14 0.98 0.98 1.50 0.25 6.12 Very High 27-18 
0006-PB-27L1045-FC11-37 21.95 127 57 0.3 4.52 2.31 0.58 0.99 0.58 1.71 High 27-19 
0006-PB-27L2045-FC11-37 21.95 127 57 0.3 4.52 2.31 0.58 0.99 0.58 1.71 High 27-20 
0002-PB-27L0032-FC11-07 11.07 50 185.2 0.3 4.04 1.47 1.47 4.88 0.37 13.29 Very High 27-21 
0004-PV-45L0040-BC11-00 6.02 39 19 0.3 4.41 0.83 0.83 1.34 0.21 6.48 Very High 45-02 
0002-PL-45L0003-BC11-00 5.54 19 19 0.3 4.35 0.91 0.23 0.69 0.23 3.03 High 45-03 
0002-PV-45L0043-BC11-00 5.54 47 39 0.3 4.29 0.91 0.91 2.25 0.23 9.90 Very High 45-04 
0003-PV-45L0015-BC11-01 5.49 47 18 0.3 4.45 0.81 0.81 1.39 0.20 6.90 Very High 45-05 
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The next step of a detailed RBI is to establish the inspection strategy and inspection intervals 
as mentioned in Figure 3.3. The inspection interval depends on the calculated remaining life 
time of material and risk level. The risk levels depend on PoF and CoF and the remaining life 
time of material depends on calculated corrosion rate. According to FORCE (2011), the 
interval inspection can be calculated based on Eq. 3.9: 
 
Inspection interval (TNI) = LR x FRL x FCV                              (Eq. 3.9) 
 
Where: 
 
TNI  = Time to next inspection or inspection interval. 
LR  = Theoretical remaining life which is calculated based on corrosion rate in Eq. 3.3 and 
critical wall thickness in Eq. 3.5.  
FRL  = Factor depending on risk level. FRL increases with decreasing the risk level and 
reduces with increasing the risk level.  
FCV  = Factor depending on confidence level of remaining wall thickness. FCV increases 
with increasing the confidence level of remaining wall thickness.  
   
Eq. 3.9 confirms that the very high risk corrosion group requires more frequent inspection 
than other corrosion groups. Refer to Table 3.8; the inspection interval of corrosion group 27-
21 will be shorter than 27-20 as PoF of 27-21 is higher than PoF of 27-20 by assuming the 
same CoF applied for both groups. Based on this explanation, the validity of inspection 
intervals of corrosion groups needs to be monitored by checking the valid range of corrosion 
rates versus the current corrosion rates as shown in Figure 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15. These 
figures are generated from table 3.8 and can be explained as follows: 
 
1. Figure 3.12 for corrosion group 21-01 
 From Table 3.8, the current corrosion rate of corrosion group 21-01 is 0.73 mm/year 
with maximum and minimum corrosion rate in order to keep High PoF is 0.99 
mm/year and 0.25 mm/year respectively. If the actual corrosion rates is higher than 
0.99 mm/year or lower than 0.25 mm/year thus the actual PoF becomes Very High or 
Medium respectively.  
 
2. Figure 3.13 for corrosion group 23-01A 
 From Table 3.8, the current corrosion rate of corrosion group 23-01A is 0.19 mm/year 
with maximum and minimum corrosion rate in order to keep Medium PoF is 0.24 
mm/year and 0.12 mm/year respectively. If the actual corrosion rates is higher than 
0.24 mm/year or lower than 0.12 mm/year, then the actual PoF becomes High or Low 
respectively.  
 
3. Figure 3.14 for corrosion group 24-07 
 From Table 3.8, the current corrosion rate of corrosion group 24-07 is 0.43 mm/year 
with maximum and minimum corrosion rate in order to keep High PoF is 1.04 
mm/year and 0.26 mm/year respectively. If the actual corrosion rates is higher than 
1.04 mm/year or lower than 0.26 mm/year, then the actual PoF becomes Very High or 
Medium respectively.  
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4. Figure 3.15 for corrosion group 27-21 
  From Table 3.8, the current corrosion rate of corrosion group 27-21 is 4.88 mm/year. 
In order to improve a PoF level from Very High to become High PoF, the corrosion 
rate shall be reduced at least to 1.47 mm/year. 
 
In this thesis, the corrosion rate using PFD 2018 is assumed as the current corrosion rate 
because the latest process simulation is not available. The current corrosion rate will be 
updated based on the latest process simulation and findings during inspection campaigns and 
corrosion monitoring. If the current corrosion rate is outside the valid range, the interval of 
inspection needs to be adjusted either making it shorter or longer interval. 
 
In Figure 3.12 and 3.13, all current corrosion rates are still within the valid range of PoF thus 
the interval of inspection does not require any adjustment. In Figure 3.14 and 3.15, many 
current corrosion rates are outside the valid range and the inspection intervals have to be 
adjusted, in this case the interval shall be shorter because the current corrosion rate is higher 
than the maximum corrosion rate for its PoF. The inspection interval of the following 
corrosion groups needs to adjusted to a shorter interval: 
 
1. Corrosion group 24-02, 24-06, 27-05B, 27-06B, 27-07, 27-08, 27-11 & 27-12 in Figure 
3.14. 
2. Corrosion group 24-02, 24-06, 27-05B, 27-06B, 27-07, 27-08, 27-11 & 27-12 in Figure 
3.15. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Valid range of CO2 corrosion rates for PoF of internal degradation in system 20 
and system 21  
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Figure 3.13. Valid range of CO2 corrosion rates for PoF of internal degradation in system 23 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Valid range of CO2 corrosion rates for PoF of internal degradation in system 24 
and system 27 
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Figure 3.15. Valid range of CO2 corrosion rates for PoF of internal degradation in system 27 
and system 45 
 
In order to get the threshold of mol % CO2, corrosion group 23-02A was selected for 
calculating the CO2 threshold as it has the highest LTV in medium PoF. As stated earlier, 
corrosion groups which have PoF ≥ High will need further investigation outside of this thesis 
due to time constraints and these groups cannot be used for determining the threshold of CO2 
as it will end up with very low mol % CO2, for example as follows: 
 
The highest LTV in Table 3.8 is corrosion group 27-21 which has LTV of 13.29 and 
calculated corrosion rate of 4.88 mm/year. In order to reduce the calculated corrosion rate 
close to CR critical, the mol % of CO2 has to be reduced to 0.0085 mol %.   
 
By using corrosion group 23-02A, we get the threshold of mol % CO2 is equal to 0.37 mol% 
as shown in Figure 3.16. With 0.37 mol% CO2, the calculated corrosion rate will be equal to 
CR critical or CR upper and it is still within the valid range of the CO2 corrosion rate as 
shown in Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.16. Effect of temperature on CO2 corrosion rate (FORCE, 2011) 
3.5.2. O2 Corrosion 
As shown in Table 3.6, Duplex Stainless Steel (22Cr and 25Cr) in the system exposed to sea 
water is susceptible to this internal degradation mechanism. On Alvheim, the produced water 
from the separators is inserted into the reservoir so we may conclude that the water injection 
system has no susceptibility to O2 corrosion. The PoF ranking for O2 corrosion is mentioned 
in Table 3.9. This table is directly taken from FORCE (2001) and no further evaluation is 
taken. Meanwhile, NORSOK M-001 (2004) recommends the maximum oxygen equivalent 
level is 50 ppb for 90% of its time in operation and 200 ppb for 10% of its time in operation 
in a non continuous system and Roberge (2007) states that reducing oxygen levels to below 
20 ppb has a significant effect on corrosion of carbon steel boilers. In this case, Roberge 
(2007) confirms the O2 threshold from FORCE (2001). 
 
Table 3.9. PoF ranking for O2 corrosion in seawater and open drain system (FORCE, 2011) 
Material PoF Ranking Criteria/Comment 
22Cr 
High 
O2 ≥ 20 ppb and Cl2 ≥ 100 
ppb 
Medium 
O2 ≥ 20 ppb and Cl2 < 100 
ppb 
Low 
O2 < 20 ppb and Cl2 < 100 
ppb 
25Cr & 
6Mo 
Medium 
O2 ≥ 20 ppb and Cl2 ≥ 100 
ppb 
Low 
O2 ≥ 20 ppb and Cl2 < 100 
ppb 
Negligible 
O2 < 20 ppb and Cl2 < 100 
ppb 
 
 55 
 
3.5.3. Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC) 
 
Although no H2S concentration in the production lines is stated in Alvheim’s basis of design, 
the H2S need to be monitored as the hydrocarbon composition might change due to new 
production wells or reservoir treatments during oil production. In general, a well stream 
containing above 3 mbar partial pressure of H2S is called sour service condition and may 
suffer from sulphide stress cracking if the materials are not designed for handling this sour 
service. On Alvheim FPSO topside, all parts exposed to hydrocarbons are designed for sour 
service requirements in accordance to NACE MR-0175/ISO 15156. The H2S concentration 
and material grade used will affect the ranking of PoF for SSC in hydrocarbon environment as 
mentioned in Table 3.10. This table is directly taken from FORCE (2001) and no further 
evaluation is taken. Meanwhile, NORSOK M-001 (2004) states higher H2S limits for generic 
CRA classes, for example: maximum partial pressure H2S for 22Cr and 25Cr is 20 mbar and 
100 mbar assuming free oxygen in the system and limited amount of chlorine. 
 
 
Table 3.10. PoF ranking for SSC in hydrocarbon environment (FORCE, 2011) 
 
PoF 
Ranking Criteria 
High Partial pressure of H2S ≥ 3 mbar and materials do not 
comply with the requirements in NACE MR-0175 
Medium Not Available 
Low Not Available 
Very low Partial pressure of H2S < 3 mbar or materials comply 
with the requirements in NACE MR-0175 
 
3.5.4. Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) 
 
Generally, only carbon steel and lower grade stainless steel in hydrocarbon system are 
susceptible to this internal degradation mechanism as shown in Table 3.6. The CRA’s such as 
stainless steel, duplex, supper duplex and titanium are generally resistant to MIC.  As stated in 
chapter 2.3, the most common bacteria causing MIC is SRB and it has two forms which are 
planktonic and sessile. FORCE (2011) states the ranking of PoF for MIC can be defined as 
mentioned in Table 3.11 and Table 3.12. Meanwhile, Stott (2003) states any planktonic SRB 
counts above 1000/ml and sessile SRB counts above 1000/cm2 are indicating a rapid growth 
of bacteria in the system and the MIC concern has to be addressed.   
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Table 3.11. PoF ranking for MIC of Carbon Steel in hydrocarbon environment (FORCE, 
2011) 
 
PoF 
Ranking Criteria 
Typical corrosion 
rates 
High Solids present. High level of SRB
1). No 
effective biocide dosing. 0.5 – 2.0 mm/y 
Medium Solids present. High level of SRB. Effective 
biocide dosing. 0.2 – 0.5 mm/y 
Low Solids present. Low level of SRB. 0.1 – 0.2 mm/y 
Very low No solids present. Low level of SRB. < 0.1 mm/y 
 
 
Note: 
1). High level of SRB means the environment has sessile more than 100/cm2 and planktonic 
more than 100/ml 
 
Table 3.12. PoF assessments for MIC in hydrocarbon environment with O2 present (FORCE, 
2011) 
 
Material Ranking Criteria/Comment 
CS Not Available 
Individual 
Assessment 
316 & 
22Cr Not Available 
Individual 
Assessment 
25Cr & 
6Mo Unlikely Immune to MIC 
All CRA's Unlikely No Ingress of O2 
 
Spot samples taken from water injection system of Alvheim FPSO Topside confirm no 
oxygen ingress in the system 44.  
 
3.5.5. Under Deposit Corrosion (UDC) 
UDC occurs when deposits form on the metal surface either from settling out of suspended 
solids such as sands or corrosion products or precipitation of dissolved chemical species. This 
deposit creates either differential aeration or differential acidity (pH) on the metal surface and 
it may increase the microbial activity. Any differential aeration and acidity will create a 
differential cell corrosion system similar to a crevice corrosion mechanism thus the area under 
the deposit will be anodic and corrode. The PoF ranking of this degradation mechanism is not 
straight forward thus individual assessment is normally performed. No process parameters 
need to be monitored for this degradation mechanism. 
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3.5.6. Galvanic Corrosion 
 
This internal degradation mechanism occurs when two dissimilar materials are electrically 
connected in the electrolyte environment. An electrolyte can be seawater, hydrocarbon 
containing water etc. Several methods may reduce the corrosion rate of galvanic corrosion as 
follows: 
 
1. Sacrificial anode to be installed close to the connection between two dissimilar materials. 
The anode shall be more active than the protected metal. 
2. Isolation gasket and bolt to be installed at flanged connections of two dissimilar materials. 
This method can be useless if the electron can easily move from anodic (less noble) to 
cathodic (more noble) material through another metallic path such as a piping support or 
instrument tubing. 
3. Rubber lining of the more noble material for certain lengths will reduce the corrosion rate 
of galvanic corrosion at the anodic material. 
The galvanic corrosion can be avoided during engineering design by avoiding the connection 
of two dissimilar materials or apply mitigation actions as mentioned above. No process 
parameters need to be monitored for this degradation mechanism. 
3.5.7. Erosion Corrosion 
 
This internal degradation mechanism occurs in flowing liquids or gases with or without 
abrasive particles when the velocity of the fluid is sufficient to remove protective films from 
the metal surface of pipework or equipment.  It includes cavitation erosion and fretting 
corrosion. Under specific conditions, most metals are susceptible to erosion-corrosion. Soft 
metals such as copper and lead are quite susceptible to this internal degradation mechanism. 
Generally, stainless steels and titanium are resistant to erosion-corrosion in many 
environments because of the stability of the passive film formed but it can be destroyed by 
sand erosion and wear.  
 
One example of cavitation corrosion is shown in Figure 3.17. It occurred in a seawater system 
made of CuNi 90/10 at Alvheim FPSO Hull and was due to flow turbulence and cavitation as 
the leaking points are close to the weld and the elbow curvature. None of this internal 
degradation mechanism occurs on Alvheim FPSO Topside as the material for the Topside 
pipework is better than the hull pipework with respect to reliability and corrosion resistance. 
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Figure 3.17. Cavitation inside CuNi 90/10 pipework 
 
According to Alvheim’s design basis, sand production is controlled in the wells by sand-
screens thus no significant sand production is anticipated. Additional mitigation to this sand 
erosion has been installed at Alvheim such as tungsten carbide choke materials on production 
flowlines. The ultrasonic measurement downstream of choke valves is performed annually as 
part of the monitoring strategy for sand erosion. No other process parameters need to be 
monitored for this degradation mechanism. 
 
 
3.5.8. Corrosion Fatigue 
Initiation and propagation of cracking in materials under a combination of cyclic stress and a 
corrosive environment is called corrosion fatigue. All metals and alloys are susceptible to 
corrosion fatigue. In corrosive environment, the required stress to create initial cracking is 
lower than the required stress in an inert environment or non-corrosive environment.  In a 
cyclic condition, the stress value to create initial cracking is usually lower than the yield stress 
of the material. Some mitigation to avoid this corrosion fatigue has been taken at Alvheim as 
follows: 
1. Proper pipe stress analysis before construction.  
2. Pipework supported properly. 
3. Annual visual inspection 
4. Vibration monitoring  
 
No process parameters need to be monitored for this degradation mechanism. 
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3.6. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
 
All plausible internal degradation mechanisms of pipework and equipment on Alvheim FPSO 
Topside have been registered in Table 3.6 and the risk level for each system has been defined 
in Table 3.7. This risk level depends on the PoF and CoF of the corrosion group; CoF levels 
of existing groups are typically constant during the life time of the asset as long as no big 
changes in temperature and pressure of fluids have occurred. These changes may affect CoF 
to personnel but no change is expected for the CoF to environment and economy. Each 
system has a PSV (Pressure Safety Valve) in order to avoid a pressure build up that may burst 
the pipework or equipment, because of that the CoF to personnel is typically not monitored 
frequently. The PoF level is the one that needs to be monitored as it affects the risk level. The 
tool for monitoring this PoF level is a KPI and is a part of managing the risk on Alvheim 
FPSO Topside.  
 
All thresholds for PoF of each internal corrosion mechanism have been established in section 
3.5 to section 3.12 and can be summarized as shown in Table 3.13. Parameters that affect PoF 
are defined as performance indicator. The following performance indicators are given as 
additional parameters to the ones that were specified in previous sections: 
 
 
1. Gas temperature of fuel gas. 
In a detailed RBI, fuel gas is specified as a dry gas thus no CO2 corrosion on carbon 
steel pipework is expected but dry gas may condense if Tdew (dew point temperature) ≥ 
Tgas (operating gas temperature) + 10oC. This condensation may trigger the CO2 
corrosion; because of this the fuel gas temperature needs to be monitored frequently. 
On Alvheim, the dew point is normally equivalent to less than 10 ppm of water which 
is about -30°C at 40 barg. It may temporarily be operated to 42 ppm which is about     
-15° at 40 barg, but that will only be for short duration during start up.  
  
2. Residual chlorine. 
NORSOK M-001 (2004) states the maximum free chlorine in a seawater system is 1.5 
ppm for 25Cr material otherwise crevice corrosion will occur. Crevice corrosion is a 
form of localized attack in which the site of the attack is an area where free access to 
the surrounding environment is restricted. Typically, crevice corrosion occurs on the 
flange face of pipework as the flange has crevices on the surface, therefore any 
difference in the chloride concentrations of material inside and outside of the crevice 
may lead to crevice corrosion. 
 
3. Seawater temperature 
NORSOK M-001 (2004) states the maximum operating temperature of chlorinated 
seawater is 20oC and 85oC for 25Cr and Titanium respectively otherwise crevice 
corrosion will occur. It shall be noted that the fluid temperature of seawater may 
increase due to heat radiation from surrounding equipment such as boilers etc.  
 
The performance indicators shall be measured frequently with measurement locations chosen 
at the most plausible location where internal corrosion may occur and it should be easy to 
access. Some measurement locations are available online for the following data: 
1. H2S concentration in export gas fiscal metering of system 27. 
2. CO2 concentration in export gas fiscal metering of system 27. 
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3. Fuel gas temperature from instrument device of 45TT0121A in system 45. 
 
Data for seawater temperatures are not available online but can be read from the existing 
temperature indicators on Alvheim which are 50TI0103, 50TI0220, 50TI0620 and 50TI0613.  
 
Data for free chlorine in the seawater system is taken from 50V0750 (drain valve in system 
50). The free chlorine concentration has been measured since 2009 to January 2012 and it 
shows the measured free chlorine exceeds the threshold value as shown in Figure 3.21.   
 
Data for MIC are not available yet and the assessment of this MIC shall be addressed in co-
operation with the corrosion engineer, production department and chemical vendor. Some 
testing kits and coupons are commercially available; the coupon is typically used for 
measuring the population of sessile SRB. Samples from dead ends of pipework are needed for 
measuring the population of planktonic SRB. Sampling from dead ends of pipework should 
be on a monthly basis meanwhile the coupon replacement should be done on a six month 
basis depending on the extent of concern.    
 
From Table 3.13, only 3 parameters out of 11 parameters are selected as corrosion KPIs 
because of their crucial contribution to maintaining the integrity of the hydrocarbon system. 
These three parameters are partial pressure of H2S, CO2 content and fuel gas temperature. 
Some parameters in the seawater system are measured daily but these parameters are not 
included in the KPIs because the consequence of seawater system failure is low. 
 
All parameters for KPIs were measured on a daily basis from 01/01/2011 to 30/05/2012 as 
shown in Figure 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20. The measured KPI is considered to be compliant if it 
does not exceed the threshold value. For a 30-day month, each day is equal to 3.3% 
compliance and at the end of the month. The number of compliant days are added and then 
multiplied by 3.3% to get the monthly percentage compliance for each KPI. The KPI average 
percentage compliance for each month can be calculated from all selected KPIs as shown in 
Table 3.14. Figure 3.22 shows the monthly average KPI compliance against the target 
compliance. It is noted that the CO2 content KPI has very low compliance and any measures 
to ensure that the system can be improved needs to be implemented. Due to the high level of 
CO2 content, radiography testing on dead legs of CS pipework of hydrocarbon systems has 
been done in November 2011 with none of them showing any CO2 corrosion. The 
radiography testing will continue on other possible locations during the 2012 inspection 
campaign. After 4 years in operation, no CO2 corrosion occurs on Alvheim’s topside. Some 
mitigations of CO2 corrosion were discussed in chapter 2 and the most suitable mitigation is 
to inject corrosion inhibitor. The overall target compliance has been set up to 65% and it will 
be increased later on when the corrective actions on the CO2 compliance are being 
implemented.    
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Table 3.13. Performance Indicators for RBI Analysis of Alvheim FPSO Topside 
 
Service System System description Performance Indicator Description Threshold 
Measure 
frequency 
Review 
frequency 
Degradation 
Mechanism 
Measurement 
location 
Hydrocarbon 16, 20, 21, 
23, 24, 27, 43 
& 57 
Topside Flowline, Crude Oil Separation, 
Crude Oil Metering,     Re-Compression, 
Gas Dehydration, Gas Export,  Flare And 
Vent And Closed Drain 
Partial pressure of H2S  <3 mbar  Daily Monthly SSC - Duplex         
SSC - CS                
SSC - 316 SS 
27AY0702A (System 
27 Gas Export 
Metering) 
Hydrocarbon 20, 21, 23, 
24, 27, 43 & 
57 
Crude Oil Separation, Crude Oil Metering, 
Re-Compression, Gas Dehydration, Gas 
Export,  Flare And Vent And Closed Drain 
CO2  content <0.37 mol% Daily Monthly CO2 Corrosion - 
CS steel 
27AY0702A (System 
27 Gas Export 
Metering) 
Hydrocarbon 20, 21, 23, 
24, 27, 43 & 
57 
Crude Oil Separation, Crude Oil Metering, Re-
Compression, Gas Dehydration, Gas Export,  
Flare And Vent And Closed Drain 
Planktonic SRB content <100 /ml Monthly Monthly MIC - CS steel To be decided later on 
Hydrocarbon 20, 21, 23, 
24, 27, 43 & 
57 
Crude Oil Separation, Crude Oil Metering, Re-
Compression, Gas Dehydration, Gas Export,  
Flare And Vent And Closed Drain 
Sessile SRB content  <100 /cm2 Every six 
months 
Every six 
months 
MIC - CS steel To be decided later on 
Produced 
Water 
29, 44 Produced Water & Water Injection Partial pressure of H2S  <3 mbar  Monthly Monthly SSC - Duplex To be decided later on 
Fuel gas 45 Fuel Gas Fuel gas temperature  > (Water 
dew point + 
10°C) 
Daily Monthly CO2-Corrosion - 
CS steel 
45TT0121A 
Seawater 50 Treated Sea Water Oxygen Equivalent = oxygen 
(ppb) +  0.1*chlorine (ppb) 
<20 ppb Monthly Monthly O2 corrosion - 
25Cr 
To be decided later on 
Seawater 50 Treated Sea Water Free chlorine <1.5 ppm Daily Monthly Crevice corrosion 
- 25Cr duplex 
Sample from 50V0750 
Seawater 50 Treated Sea Water Seawater temperature <20 °C Daily Monthly Crevice corrosion 
- 25Cr duplex 
50TI0613 
Seawater 50 Treated Sea Water Seawater temperature <85 °C Daily Monthly Crevice corrosion 
- Titanium 
50TI0103, 50TI0220 
& 50TI0620 
Open Drain 56 Open Drain Oxygen Equivalent = oxygen 
(ppb) +  0.1*chlorine (ppb) 
<20 ppb Monthly Monthly O2 corrosion - 
22Cr 
To be decided later on 
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Figure 3.18. Data for partial pressure of H2S from Gas Export Metering 27II001 
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Figure 3.19. Data for CO2 concentration from Gas Export Metering 27II001 
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Figure 3.20. Data for fuel gas temperature from 45TT0121A 
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Figure 3.21. Data for free chlorine concentration from 50V0750 
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Table 3.14. Available KPI on Alvheim FPSO Topside integrity  
KPI Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 
Partial pressure of H2S 
(mbar) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CO2 concentration (mol%) 10% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fuel gas temperature (oC) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Average compliance 70% 68% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 68% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67%
Target compliance 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
 
Colour code: 
Green : Measure meet target 
Amber : Measure not meeting target.  Corrective action possible before dangerous outcome 
Red  : Immediate corrective action required to prevent dangerous outcome. Corrective action such as radiography testing in hydrocarbon system has been done during inspection campaign in November 2011 and 
the result shows no CO2 corrosion occurs. Radiography testing for other locations will be performed during 2012 inspection campaign. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Plotted average monthly KPI against the target level  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Nov-10 Feb-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Apr-12 Jul-12
K
P
I
Time
Monthly Average KPI Compliance
Target
Average monthly KPI
 67 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In previous chapter, the author has identified all plausible internal corrosion threats of each 
system on Alvheim FPSO Topside, determined the highest risk level of each system, 
developed corrosion performance indicators of all plausible internal degradation mechanisms, 
determined the threshold value of each performance indicator, determined the KPIs from 
corrosion performance indicators, collected all available data from Alvheim FPSO Topside 
and compare it with the threshold value, generated the graphic of plotted average monthly 
KPI against the target level. Now it comes to some conclusions and recommendations. 
Regularly monitoring and measuring performance indicators are part of the Alvheim CIMS as 
shown in Figure 3.2. Performance indicators of internal corrosion on Alvheim FPSO Topside 
have been established and those most affecting the integrity performance of Alvheim FPSO 
Topside are selected as KPIs. These KPIs are measured on a daily basis and the compliance 
percentage of each KPI is defined by comparing it with the agreed threshold value. It reveals 
that a correction action is needed on the CO2 content KPI. The latest inspection campaign in 
November 2011 reveals no CO2 corrosion occurs in the dead ends of CS pipework in 
hydrocarbon systems. It can be concluded that the KPIs have the following benefits: 
1. KPIs are good tools for capturing and assessing data related that most affect the 
Alvheim FPSO Topside integrity. 
2. KPIs can be used for identifying any problem during Alvheim CIMS implementation. 
In Alvheim’s case, CO2 higher than the threshold value may lead to loss of integrity of 
CS pipework. 
3. KPIs improve topside integrity engineers monitoring of the indicators that have the 
greatest affection to Alvheim integrity.  
4. KPIs can be used for reporting issues related to Alvheim’s integrity to senior 
management as it provides info at a high level and is easy to follow. 
5. KPIs are good tools for managing risks identified through RBI analysis of Alvheim 
FPSO Topside. 
The recommendations related to KIPs are as follows: 
1. In this thesis, only KPIs related to internal corrosion mechanisms were established. To 
get a better overview of Alvheim integrity, some KPIs of external corrosion 
mechanisms should be added, e.g.: implementation of Corrosion Under Insulation 
(CUI) inspection and implementation of a painting campaign.  
2. The trend of average corrosion KPI compliance on Alvheim FPSO Topside is stagnant 
due to zero compliance on CO2 content. Future corrective actions need to be agreed 
between the corrosion engineer, integrity engineer, process engineer, production 
engineer and chemical vendor. 
3. Further investigation on CO2 corrosion is required. It might be the calculated corrosion 
rate is too conservative as there have been no findings so far from the last inspection 
campaign. 
4. Measurement frequency in Table 3.13 can be adjusted based on the latest findings, 
e.g.: six-month basis for measuring sessile SRB population can be reduced to quarterly 
basis if the findings show an increasing trend. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
System 16 Flowlines 
The system consists of six production lines, e.g.: Kneler A, Kneler B, East Kameleon, Boa, 
Vilje and Volund,  from STP Swivel to Alvheim inlet separator and 3rd party separator as 
shown in Figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1. Process sketch of system 16 (MONAS, 2005) 
 
System 20 Crude Oil Separation and Stabilization 
The system consists of two-stage separations with crude heating, coalesce and oil/water 
separator and its purpose is to stabilize the well streams to crude oil specifications. Gas and 
water will be separated from crude oil in the separators and oil export TVP (True Vapour 
Pressure) specification will be fulfilled by heaters. A system overview is shown in Figure A.2. 
 
 
Figure A.2. Process sketch of system 20 (MONAS, 2005) 
Alvheim Inlet Separator 
3rd Party Inlet Separator 
20VA101 
20VA201 
20VA002 
20VJ001 
20VA003 
Heater 
Heater 
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System 21 Crude Oil Metering 
The system consists of crude oil pumps, crude oil coolers and a fiscal metering station for 
crude oil stabilization and its purpose is to control the temperature of the crude so no wax 
formation in the storage tanks, to meter the stabilized oil in accordance to fiscal standard and 
to deliver the crude oil to shuttle tanker via offloading hose. A system overview is shown in 
Figure A.3. 
 
Figure A.3. Process sketch of system 21 (MONAS, 2005) 
System 23 Re-Compression 
The system consists of two parallel trains (2 x 50%) and each train consists of two 
compression stages with dedicated coolers and scrubbers as shown in Figure A.4. Its purpose 
is to raise the inlet gas pressure to match the operating pressure of inlet separators. 
 
  
Figure A.4. Process sketch of system 23 (MONAS, 2005) 
 
System 24 Gas Dehydration 
The system consists of glycol contactor, dehydrator inlet scrubber and cooler as shown in 
Figure A.5. Its purpose is to remove any water inside of the gas by using glycol contactor in 
order to avoid any wet gas inside of gas export line. A wet gas may create corrosion, water 
condensation and plugs inside of gas export pipeline. 
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Figure A.5. Process sketch of system 24 (MONAS, 2005) 
System 27 Gas Export 
The system consists of two parallel two stage gas compression trains as shown in Figure A.6. 
Its purpose is to compress the produced gas to gas export pipeline pressure and treat the gas to 
cricondenbar specification in order to avoid condensation in the gas export pipeline. 
 
 
Figure A.6. Process sketch of system 27 (MONAS, 2005) 
System 41 Heating Medium 
The system consists of necessary pumps, heaters, WHRU’s (Waste Heat Recovery Units), 
expansion tanks and pipework with the control valves to regulate the system. The heating 
medium is clean fresh water and the heat is recovered from the WHRU’s in the power 
generator exhaust channels.  
 
System 42 Chemical Injection 
The system consists of all pipework associated with chemical injection including storage 
tanks and pumps. Its purpose is to inject chemicals to subsea manifold, separators, crude 
export metering and down-hole. Chemicals used in Alvheim such as corrosion inhibitor, scale 
inhibitor, demulsifier and wax inhibitor.  
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System 43 Flare and Atmospheric Vent 
The system consists of all pipework and equipment downstream of relief valves and 
blowdown valves up to the flare tip.  
 
System 44/29 Produced Water Treatment/Water Injection 
The system consists of all pipework associated with water injection line including 
equipment’s such as coalescer, produced water pump and hydrocyclone package. Its purpose 
is to treat the produced water to the required specification for water injection well or 
discharge it to overboard during upset conditions. 
 
System 45 Fuel Gas 
The system consists of all pipework associated with fuel gas distribution including scrubber, 
superheater and metering package. The fuel gas is extracted from the outlet of the dehydration 
system (glycol contactor) thus the gas is dry and no internal corrosion threat from a dry gas. 
 
System 46 Methanol Injection System 
The system consists of all equipment and pipework associated with methanol injection 
including storage tanks and pumps.  
 
System 47 Electro chlorination 
The system consists of all equipment and pipework associated with hypochlorite generation 
and distribution. Its purpose is to control biological growth in the seawater system by 
injecting hypochlorite to the seawater lift pumps. 
 
System 50 Seawater 
The system consists of all equipment and pipework associated with seawater distribution and 
utilization. Its purpose is to reduce the temperature of hydrocarbon liquid or gas by using 
seawater medium. 
 
System 53 Freshwater  
The system consists of all equipment and pipework associated with fresh water, potable water 
and high pressure water distribution and utilization. 
 
System 56 Open Drain  
The system consists of all pipework associated with the collection of spillage, wash water, 
deluge water and rain water including open drain tanks, pumps and centrifuge package. Its 
purpose is to treat the oily water before discharge it to overboard or route it to hull slop tank. 
 
System 57 Closed Drain  
The system consists of all pipework associated with the hydrocarbon liquid collection from 
vessels or other process hydrocarbon stream and its purpose is to collect hydrocarbon liquid 
drain, to safely dispose and degas the liquid thus drain the liquid to the hull slop tank.  
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System 62 Diesel Oil  
The system consists of all equipment associated with the distribution of diesel oil up to the 
end user such as main generator. 
 
System 63 Compressed Air 
The system consist of all equipment associated with the utility air and instrument air 
distribution up to the end user and its purpose is to supply utility and instrument air to all 
consumers such as inert gas generation, pneumatic actuated valves etc. 
 
System 64 Nitrogen Generation and Distribution 
The system consists of all equipment associated with the nitrogen production from 
compressed air up to the end user and it will be used for blanketing and purging of another 
system during maintenance.  
 
System 65 Hydraulic 
The system consists of a hydraulic power package with supply and return line and its purpose 
is to serve all topside hydraulic oil users such as hydraulic operated EV, HV and XV valves. 
 
System 71 Firewater 
The topside firewater system consists of all pipework associated with the firewater 
distribution from firewater ring main on VUD (Vessel Upper Deck) to the firewater 
equipment such as firewater monitors and nozzles.   
 
